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This paper analyzes competition for capital between welfare-maximizing gov-
ernments in a framework with agglomeration tendencies and asymmetric union-
ization. We ¯nd that a unionized country's government ¯nds it optimal to use tax
policy to induce industry to relocate towards a location with a competitive labor
market instead of realizing the bene¯ts from higher wage income while exporting
part of the wage burden to foreign consumers. Via the tax regime e®ect, which
favors the factor capital, and the e±ciency e®ect, consumers and producers alike
bene¯t from o®-shoring industry towards a low-cost country. Our result quali¯es
¯rst intuition that defending high wage industries is bene¯cial to a country as
part of the associated cost is shifted to foreign consumers.
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In January 2008, Nokia's Executive Vice president Veli SundbÄ ack announced the closure
of its handset factory in Bochum in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the reloca-
tion of Nokia's manufacturing activity to Cluj (Romania) as a response to changes
in market conditions and an increased requirement for cost e®ectiveness. However, as
Nokia had received investment subsidies from the state of NRW for its production site
in Bochum and will be exempt from the real estate tax in Romania, the decision to
relocate its production facility to a low-labour-cost country reignited an old debate on
the distribution of state subsidies. As a matter of fact, the latest case of production
delocation is just another example of what has been common practice long before the
enlargement of the European Union: Governments exploiting ¯rms' responsiveness to
subsidies and engaging in subsidy races.1 Accordingly, Germany may have lost the lat-
est race for a large manufacturer, but has come o® as the winner in the past at the
cost of subsidy payments when bidding for a BMW plant in 2001 against Kolin (Czech
Republic) or averting Volkswagen's threats to relocate towards Hungary in 1996.
Against this background, the present paper assesses the outcome and welfare impli-
cations of a subsidy race between countries with di®erent degrees of labor market
distortions. Our analysis builds on a model in which industrial activity is ine±ciently
locked-in in a unionized core country. What we have in mind is that a certain re-
gion historically emerged as an industrial center which sparked the emergence of trade
unions, capturing some of the location rents earned in such an agglomeration. Our
most important result is that tax competition among a leading unionized industry core
and a challenging emerging country is e±ciency enhancing as it leads to relocation of
industry towards the country with a non-distorted labor market. A government of an
industrial core whose objective it is to maximize residents' welfare will ¯nd it optimal
to let its competitor attract mobile capital so as to bene¯t from increased e±ciency
and the competing location's tax regime.
1As more than three quarters of subsidies to industry in the OECD are investment subsidies (see
Fuest and Huber, 2000, Table 1) there is hardly any doubt that local governments use subsidies as an
instrument to in°uence the location decision of capital. Van Biesenbroeck (2008) gives an overview
of bidding wars between the Canadian and the US government for the automotive industry. See also
Greenstone and Moretti (2004).
1Local labor markets are typically thought of as important determinants of subsidy poli-
cies, disregarding alternative employment opportunities of local workers and the fact
that consumers across the country as well as shareholders of locally owned companies
may bene¯t hugely from real capital moving to low-wage or low-tax regions. Our at
¯rst sight somewhat surprising result suggests that what we observe in everyday polit-
ical discussions and decisions may, in some respects, be in contrast to what would be
optimal policy once general equilibrium e®ects are taken into account.
Moreover, disentangling the welfare e®ects of industry relocation to factor groups re-
veals that capitalists are the clear winners of the subsidy race as they bene¯t from
lower consumer prices and the repatriation of subsidy income. Workers of the non-
unionized competitive industry in the winning country bene¯t from their government's
action only if union wages have been way above the competitive wage rate such that
the bene¯t from lower consumer prices compensates the ¯nancing costs of attracting an
industry cluster. The opposite holds for non-unionized workers in the former industrial
core country. Surprisingly, they su®er, together with former unionized workers, from
a delocation of industry and in particular when union wages were high. Since union
wages depend on the same parameter as consumers' love for variety a loss of industry
will be more severe if the valuation for the industry good is high as this will have a
strong impact on the country's consumer price index.
Our modelling approach has various advantages. Firstly, the monopolistic competition
framework allows us to be consistent with empirical ¯ndings by Stewart (1990), Abowd
and Lemieux (1993) and Nickell et al. (1994) who give evidence for unions' wage setting
behaviour to depend on ¯rms' market power next to their own bargaining power.
Secondly, the model which follows recent work by Borck et al. (2009) is able to re°ect
the stylized fact that economic activity is not evenly distributed across space but
tends to cluster according to certain agglomeration mechanisms as outlined by Marshall
(1890), creating location rents for each individual ¯rm. These location rents can to a
certain extent be extracted, e.g. by governments or unions without changing the spatial
allocation of ¯rms instantaneously.
Our work draws on di®erent strands of the literature. Recent years have seen an in-
creasing interest in the interaction of agglomeration economies and local government
tax setting behaviour (Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Baldwin and
2Krugman (2004), Borck and P°Ä uger (2006)) with one major insight being that the
presence of agglomeration economies reduces the mobility of capital and creates tax-
able location rents. These models, however, do not incorporate labor market frictions
as an additional factor in the competition for mobile capital. Picard and Toulemonde
(2006) examine the role of trade unions on the allocation of ¯rms across two regions.
They describe how the existence of union wages reinforce the home market e®ect sup-
porting the concentration of ¯rms in one location. A parallel strand in the literature
has focused on the deterring e®ects of unionization on foreign direct investment (Leahy
and Montagna (2000); Naylor and Santoni (2003); Lommerud et al. (2003) ).2 These
papers, however, consider only trade unions and ¯rms while ignoring government tax
policies. A notable exception is recent work by Hau°er and Mittermaier (2008) who
show that a unionized country with additional location disadvantages (such as a smaller
market) may end up attracting mobile foreign capital, whereby taxes have a strategic
e®ect on the union's behavior. Our model however di®ers conceptually as it explicitly
accounts for agglomeration tendencies which are empirically well established3 and ex-
plain the co-existence of industrialized core and lagging regions as empirically outlined
in Redding and Venables (2004). Moreover, our paper, by contrast, examines the role
unions plays for tax competition without their behavior being controllable (directly or
indirectly so) by governments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general setup
of the model. Section 3 illustrates the impact of tax competition on the allocation of
industrial ¯rms. Section 4 demonstrates the welfare e®ects on each single factor group.
Section 5 discusses the outcomes of the game for an alternative government objective.
Section 6 concludes.
2These contributions are part of a more general literature that analyzes the interaction between
unionization, imperfect competition in goods markets, and economic integration. See e.g. Brander and
Spencer (1988), Huizinga (1993), Dri±ll and van der Ploeg (1995), and Naylor (1998).
3For an overview of the empirical literature on agglomeration economies see Rosenthal and Strange
(2004).
32 The basic model
The theoretical model follows the model proposed by Borck et al. (2009). We consider
two countries i 2 fh;fg (h and f being mnemonic for `home' and `foreign') where
one of the two production factors, labor (L), is immobile, whereas the other, capital
(K), is mobile across countries such that it can be employed in one region while its
owners (who do not move) spend its return in the other region. Countries are symmetric
in technology, preferences and size, but are allowed to di®er in labor market rigidity
as measured by a parameter of union power. There are two sectors, an `A' sector
with perfect competition, and an industrial `M' sector displaying di®erentiated goods,
increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Trade in the competitive
good is costless, whereas the increasing returns sector faces per unit `iceberg' transport
costs ¿ µ a la Samuelson (1954) which means that for each unit to arrive at location j,
1 + ¿ units have to be shipped from location i. The A sector produces a homogeneous
traditional good which we choose to be the num¶ eraire using labor only. Units are scaled
such that one unit of labor produces one unit of output, so that the competitive wage
also equals one.
2.1 Preferences
There are two types of households in each country, inelastically supplying their factor
endowment, labor and capital, respectively. In country i, there is a total of Ki+Li
households, whose utility stems from consumption of the traditional as well as the
di®erentiated, industrial varieties. Those preferences are re°ected by a two-tier utility
function, whereby the upper tier is quasi-linear and the lower tier is of the C.E.S. type.
The upper tier utility function of a household is
Ui(Mi;Ai) = ®lnMi + Ai ¡ ®[ln® ¡ 1]; (1)
where the last term is a constant that disappears when indirect utility is derived, Ai
denotes consumption of the traditional good and Mi stands for di®erentiated industrial














; ¾ > 1; N = ni + nj: (2)
4Here ¾ denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and
ni the mass of varieties produced in i. mii and mji denote the quantity consumed
by a household in country i of a variety produced in i and j, respectively. Assuming
0 < ® < yis, (i = h;f; s = K;L) it is ensured that both goods will be consumed.
Utility maximization yields the following demand functions:
Mi = ®
Pi; Ais = yis ¡ ®; s = K;L
mii = ®pi(v)¡¾P
¾¡1












denotes the perfect C.E.S. price index4 where we take into account that ¯rms within
one country are identical and charge identical producer prices.5 Indirect utility is
Vis = yis ¡ ®lnPi; s = K;L (5)
where income is either labor (`L') income or capital (`K') income.
2.2 Industrial production
The perfectly competitive A sector has already been described above. Every ¯rm in the
industrial sector produces one variety6 with a ¯xed input, namely one unit of capital,
and labor. Moreover, a higher concentration of industry in the country lowers the labor
input requirement, according to the following speci¯cation: For each unit of output,
°i ´ 1=(1 + µni) units of labor are needed as a variable input, where µ > 1 measures
the local knowledge spill-over occurring between workers of the M sector. This way
of modelling spill-overs is obviously a short-cut for considering the various channels
through which industry concentration may bene¯t each and every single ¯rm. It can
be rationalized in the present setting by knowledge exchange or thick labor markets.7
4This is the expenditure needed to purchase a unit-level of welfare.
5However, producer prices across regions are no longer equal once we allow for labor market fric-
tions.
6Note that this is not an assumption, but a result. For details, refer to Baldwin et al. (2003).
7For a thorough analysis on the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies, see Duranton and
Puga (2004).
5Using this speci¯cation, the ¯rms' pro¯t function in i reads
¼i = (pi ¡ wi°i)qi ¡ ri; (6)
where pi denotes the consumer price, wi is the wage rate, and ri is the capital reward
rate. Equilibrium in the goods market requires total (world) demand for a domestic
industrial good to equal supply of this variety. The market clearing condition reads
qi = mii(Li + Ki) + ¿mij(Lj + Kj) (7)
This latter term shows that part of demand is indirect due to iceberg trade costs which






whereby the same price, multiplied by ¿, is charged to customers abroad. Now, since
capital supply is ¯xed, so is the number of ¯rms which will bid for capital; hence, its
compensation adjusts so as to ensure zero pro¯ts in equilibrium. Using this zero-pro¯t





Labor demand of an industrial ¯rm reads
l
M
i = °iqi: (10)
2.3 Mobile factor's reward
In the short run the allocation of capital and hence the location of M ¯rms is exogenous.
To derive capital's reward note that, due to the fact that one unit of capital is needed
to run a ¯rm, its reward is bid up to the point where it equals operating pro¯t. To
ease notation, we will henceforth use the share notation where sn ´ nh=N denotes
region h's share of the world's industry, ¸ ´ Lh=L is region h's share of world labor
and · ´ Kh=K denotes the share of world capital region h owns. With (8) and (9),
it follows immediately that the capital reward rate ri re°ects operating pro¯t, i.e.
6ri = (1=¾)piqi. Using this, the demand functions (3) and market clearing (7) and
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In the long run capital is mobile and seeks for the highest nominal return. Local
technological spillovers on the sectoral level support a locational equilibrium where
all industrial activity is clustered in one region since, all else equal an increase in the
number of ¯rms in h increases operating pro¯t in h and hence the capital reward gap
(rh ¡ rf) which induces a further capital in°ow into h. On the other hand, ¯rms in
h will face intense local competition as sn increases which deters other ¯rms to enter
the market. However, for ongoing trade integration Á ¯rms compete with other ¯rms
irrespective of their location which entails that the opportunity cost of agglomerating
in one country and serving the foreign market from abroad become low. Consequently,
for a su±ciently high level of trade freeness ¯rms will be agglomerated in one region as
they bene¯t from the spatial proximity to other ¯rms through local industry spill-over
e®ects. The critical level of trade freeness at which the bene¯t of agglomeration begins
to exceed the cost of serving from one location is typically denoted as the break point





sn=1=2= 0 for Á.8
For the purpose of our later analysis which assesses the outcome of a tax competition
game between an industrialized country hosting an industry cluster (`core') and a
lagging region (`periphery'), we describe a locational equilibrium where the level of
trade freeness is su±ciently high (Á > ÁB) such that all industry is agglomerated in
one region, say h.9 This could be due to historical reasons, just as the story goes in
Krugman's seminal 1991 paper. For instance, one could think of a highly industrialized
8A formal expression of the break point is available upon request. For a more detailed model
exposition see Borck et al. (2009).
9Tax competition within agglomeration models where trade costs are so high that no agglomeration
occurs yield results that are closer in nature to the `basic tax competition model' (see Baldwin et al.
(2003)). For an analysis of such interior cases in a New Trade Theory model, refer to Egger and Seidel
7country in Western Europe versus an emerging market in Eastern Europe. As said in
the introduction, we think that historically determined agglomeration patterns then
may have sparked labor's organization, giving rise to asymmetric unionization. Firms
in the industrial core earn an agglomeration rent (­) which is de¯ned as the loss a
single ¯rm would incur if it relocated to the periphery, given that all other ¯rms stay
in the core. In other words, capital is tied to the core and capital owners will have
no incentive to relocate their capital unit as long as they earn positive location rents
which can be expressed as


















Obviously, the agglomeration rent is increasing in µ the intensity of local industry
spill-overs, the level of trade integration Á and foreign's wage rate wf, whereas it is
decreasing in core's wage, wh.
2.4 Union wage setting
As noted earlier the emergence of an industrial cluster may have sparked labor's orga-
nization, giving rise to asymmetric unionization. We ¯nd it therefore natural to choose
the industrialized core to be the unionized country whereas periphery's labor market
is perfectly competitive. Hence, whereas the immobile factor's reward in the periph-
ery is equal to the competitive wage rate, we allow ¯rm-speci¯c unions (which are
conceptually identical to sector-speci¯c unions in this model) in the core to set the
nominal10 reward for unionized workers using a decentralized wage setting approach
for two reasons: Nationwide unions are hardly observed in reality and, more impor-
tantly, the feature of our model that unions, much like competing ¯rms, try each to
get the highest rent possible without internalizing consequences for the overall price
level, tax policies and industry location, is one that makes it plausible as a stylized
description of many OECD countries' union behavior. Workers employed in unionized
¯rms will enjoy higher nominal wages than those working in the non-unionized sector of
(2007) who show that a country with a stronger labor market distortion will ¯nd it optimal to choose
a lower Nash tax rate in competition for mobile capital.
10Obviously, we do not use a monetary model here. We use the term `nominal' as opposed to `real'
in the sense that the latter means taking the price index into account.
8the economy. Consequently, as ¯rms set their prices according to a ¯xed mark-up rule
(8), consumer prices will, of course, be higher under unionization, which implies that
A sector employees and capital owners will lose from it, as will foreign country's resi-
dents who buy imported di®erentiated goods from core's industry. The non-unionized
traditional A industry serves as a `bu®er' sector for those who do not ¯nd employment
in the industrial M sector, so there will be no unemployment.
We employ a monopoly union approach,11 where the union maximizes the nominal
wage bill of its members over and above the competitive one, (wh ¡ 1)lM
i . The ¯rm
then exerts its `right to manage', i.e. it chooses optimal output given the wage rate.
From here on, wh denotes the union-sector wage in h (whereas the competitive wages in
core and periphery are equal to 1, see above). Using (7), (10) and the demand functions
from (3), we rewrite union's objective function,











f ((1¡·)+(1¡¸)].12 The left hand side of (13) reveals
how each union equally weighs the factors `wage rate above competitive wage rate' and
`employment' so as to maximize the excess wage bill. The iso-elasticity of both labor
demand (that stems from the iso-elasticity of product demand and constant per unit
labor input requirement) and the ¯rm's part of the Nash bargaining lead to the wage
that maximizes (13)




which is simply a ¯xed mark-up on the competitive wage. Intuitively, the union wage
rate falls in the elasticity of substitution which measures a ¯rm's mark-up in the mo-
nopolistically competitive industry.13
11This is a special case of Nash bargaining between the representative union and the ¯rm where
all the bargaining power is with the union. We are aware that this is only one out of many ways to
model industrial relations; however, it seems to be the most widely used one due to its tractability.
For an exhaustive overview of collective bargaining and some empirical evidence, we refer to Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004).
12Note that each union neglects the e®ects on the economy's consumer price index.
13It is worth noting that we get an only quantitatively di®erent result with the more general Nash
bargaining approach. The union's outside option is zero, and the ¯rm's outside option is to produce
nothing, having already sunk the ¯xed cost which is the same whether an agreement is reached or
9A natural question that arises within a core-periphery equilibrium and unions' mark-up
wages in the core is whether, in the absence of government intervention, this allocation
of capital remains stable. This is a straightforward problem to tackle, which leads us
to
Proposition 1 Agglomeration rents earned in the core can partially be reaped by trade






. Beyond this point, the core-
periphery equilibrium becomes unstable as the rents in f are higher.
For the proof, we simply set rh equal to rf and solve the equation for wh, evaluating
the expression at sn = 1. This is the `break wage rate' above which each and every
unit of capital is better o® in country f than in the core h. The ¯rst derivatives
are straightforward: wb rises in local technological spill-over (µ) and falls with market
integration (Á). Fig. 1 illustrates the stability of the core-periphery equilibrium under
asymmetric unionization.
Fig. 1 reveals that as long as the union wage rate set in the core does not exceed the
break wage rate wb, capital will be tied to the region where it earns an agglomeration
rent. Of course, with the presence of unions in the agglomerated core part of the location
rent which, in the absence of labor market distortion fully accrued to capital owners
are now redirected to unionized workers.
3 Tax competition
Governments maximize residents' welfare and deploy lump-sum taxes on factor endow-
ment, using the revenues for a direct subsidy to capital employed within their borders.14
In accordance with the models in this literature (see Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
not and hence cancels from the Nash maximand (This point is parallel to Picard and Toulemonde
(2006). They emphasize that this assumption is implicitly made in many models where ¯xed costs are
set to zero). Adding weights of ¯ and 1 ¡ ¯ to the union's and ¯rm's objectives in the Nash product,
respectively, and maximizing yields wh = 1+¯=(¾¡1). Since this does not provide us with additional
insights, we do not pursue this further.
14Tax competition here is modelled in a very simple way: Given that the owners of both factors are
immobile, they are simply taxed on their endowment, i.e. residence-based taxes are employed.
10Figure 1: Stability of core-periphery equilibria under asymmetric unionization












¾ = 4; ® = 0:5; µ = 0:3; Á = 0:6.
Borck and P°Ä uger (2006)), we assume that the core is a Stackelberg leader in that it
gets to set its tax rate ¯rst. In our framework, this assumption can be rationalized in
the following way: The country that disposes of the unionized industries knows that it
may face competition from a challenger and will essentially play an `entry-deterrence'
game.
Letting zi denote a subsidy to capital employed in i and ri + zi the return to capital
including subsidies, we end up with the government budget constraints
snzh = Th(· + ¸); (1 ¡ sn)zf = Tf((1 ¡ ·) + (1 ¡ ¸)); (15)
with Ti denoting the tax rate. To best disentangle the e®ects of asymmetric unionization
on the location of capital we assume that countries are of equal size (· = ¸ = 0.5).15
Governments are utilitarian and maximize the sum of residents' indirect utility, where





h (wh ¡ ®lnPh ¡ Th); (16)
V
A
h = (L ¡ L
M
h )(1 ¡ ®lnPh ¡ Th); (17)
V
K
h = Kh(yK ¡ ®lnPh ¡ Th); (18)
15The interested reader is referred to Borck et al. (2009) who consider ine±ciencies arising through
asymmetrically sized countries.
11where yK denotes capitalist's income and LM
h = lM
h nh is the core's industrial sector's
labor demand. Observe that since the world is a lumpy place in this model, both
parties will e®ectively compare two situations: being the core (henceforth indicated
by the superscript `c') or the periphery (indicated by `p'). At this point, the simple
structure of the model gives us a lot of mileage when it comes to optimal policy analysis
as we get a closed-form welfare function. Taking the example of country h being the








































































where ° ´ 1=(1 + µ). Note that part of core's union wage rate is borne by consumers
abroad (`wage cost exporting').
Moreover, given our assumption that the labor market distortion occurs only in h, we
can show that global welfare WF glob = WFh +WFf could be enhanced if the industry
core shifted towards the non-unionized periphery:
Proposition 2 For high levels of trade freeness and wf < wh < wb the core-periphery




16Note that rhjsn=1 = rfjsn=0 = 2®=¾.
12Proof: See Appendix A. ¥
The obvious question then is whether core will defend its industry cluster and prevent
the shift of industry towards an e±cient allocation, using a generous tax regime to
compensate capital for high union wages and at the same time ensuring higher nominal
wages for its industrial workers. Hosting the industry core is attractive since local
production avoids consumer-borne trade costs for one's residents (`cost-of-living e®ect').
Moreover, whereas the bene¯t of higher nominal wages accrues to unionized workers
in the core only, part of the resulting higher consumer prices is borne by consumers
abroad (`wage cost exporting'). However, the latter e®ect enhances welfare in the core
only up to a certain union wage level after which consumer prices become so high that
less workers will be employed in the unionized sector as less of the industrial good is
demanded. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 which depicts core's welfare as a function of
union wages in the absence of subsidies
Figure 2: Core's welfare function for di®erent union wages









¾ = 4; ® = 0:3; µ = 0:3; Á = 0:6.
3.1 Second Stage: Periphery's government
Solving the game via backward induction, we start with the government of the periphery
at stage two of the tax game. As all ¯rms are alike, this is a straightforward exercise:
The government of the periphery, government f, has a maximum subsidy/minimum
tax it is willing to o®er. This can be found at the point where its overall welfare level
is the same no matter if it hosts the industry or not, WF c
f = WF
p
f. Solving this for











The ¯rst term denotes the foregone repatriation of subsidy income from c for periph-
ery's capitalists once p attracts the industry. The second term captures the bene¯ts
of industry relocation towards the non-unionized country. Residents in the periphery
bene¯t from lower consumer prices since wages are competitive and transport costs
are absent for them once industry locates in the periphery. On the other hand, the
government of the periphery knows that it has to o®er each ¯rm at least what core's
government o®ers, in addition to the agglomeration rent ­. We call this subsidy level
`zmin
f ' which is obtained solving ­ + (zh ¡ zf) = 0 for zh using (12):
z
min















Now, as long as zmax
f is greater than zmin
f , periphery can pro¯tably attract the capital
from the core. Note that these terms depend only on core's tax policy (zh) and exoge-
nous parameters (as the monopoly unions' wage, wh, only depends on the parameter
¾). The next step is to examine government h's behavior.
3.2 First Stage: Core's government
The core's government is aware of the in°uence its policy exerts on the ability and
willingness of the periphery to attract capital. To determine core's optimal behavior,
we ¯rst determine the policy at which periphery's government will not be able to
pro¯tably attract the mobile capital. In a next step we check whether core's government
will actually want to hold on to the industrial core.
From inspection of (24) and (25), it can easily be seen how we can work out the
`knife-edge' level of subsidy, say zd
h, at which the core can make it unpro¯table for the
periphery to attract the industry which will be the case whenever zmin
f is at least as
large as zmax
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14This means that core's o®er has to be at least zd
h to make sure that the periphery's
government will not be a threat to the pre-existing allocation.17
It is however not immediately obvious what core's government opts for: Production in
its part of the world leads to a lower price index for all of its consumers (`cost-of-living
e®ect'). Moreover, industrial workers in the core earn higher wages than they otherwise
would - whereby part of this excess wage bill is paid, via higher prices, by foreigners
(`wage cost exporting e®ect'). On the other hand, allowing the industry to delocate
to f means h's capitalists would bene¯t from the repatriation of subsidy income and
also that its consumers would be able to buy goods produced in a low-wage region. So,
in the case where core holds on to its industry, it will set zh = zd
h. In the case where
it does not, it will set the subsidy level marginally smaller, zh = zd
h ¡ ², where ² is
some small but positive number. To see this latter point, note that this guarantees the
highest possible subsidy transfer from the periphery (remember, zmin
f = zh+­). Core's















h ¡ ² otherwise.
This gives us also f's optimal policy when it attracts all industry: As the second
mover, it takes the given z¤
h. So we plug zd
h for zh into (25), which is optimal by a
similar argument to the one above: It is the cheapest way to attract the industry. On
the contrary, in case of no industry delocation it is simple to conclude that the subsidy
to capital and hence the tax on L and K will be zero as being the periphery implies
not hosting any industry.
Now that we derived each countries' optimal policies in the two cases, we proceed to
the equilibrium outcome of the game. The reduced-form equations can be obtained by
plugging the optimal policies for each case into the region's respective welfare functions
(19)-(22) using (25) and (26). It is then a straightforward exercise to compare welfare






f). If it is positive, then the country as a whole is better o® holding on to its
industry; if it is negative, the opposite holds true. Using (19) and (21) the welfare
17Obviously, every better o®er will do the trick, but will never be optimal since the subsidies do not
alleviate any distortion. Rather, they amount to a transfer to the other country which will be kept as
tiny as possible.
























The excess wage bill in the ¯rst term re°ects the bene¯ts of keeping all industry whereas
the second and third term re°ect the ¯nancing cost and the foregone subsidy payment




exceed one. Hence, depending on the level of trade freeness and the union wage the
last term will be positive or negative. Note that both governments take into account
all general equilibrium e®ects. Speci¯cally, all tax and wage e®ects as well as trade cost
and price e®ects are taken into account. We can now state
Proposition 3 A welfare-maximizing government in the unionized core will ¯nd it in






f ) < 0.
Proof: See Appendix B. ¥
This result is striking at ¯rst sight. After all, the core acts as a Stackelberg leader and
maximizes welfare within its border. So one might have expected it to hold on to its
industry via a generous tax regime since the costs of higher union wages are partly
borne by consumers abroad while the bene¯ts of higher wage income accrue solely
to workers within the country. Upon closer inspection, however, our result is quite
intuitive: By letting its capital relocate to f, while still owning it, country h gets rid
of the labor market distortion18 and, at the same time, makes sure capital owners get
a favorable tax regime abroad, leading to repatriated subsidies. This makes a nice case
why governments may, in bidding for mobile factors, make favorable o®ers: They may
have in mind the preferential regimes their countrymens' businesses will get abroad.
Furthermore, the presence of a challenging emerging market, i.e. tax competition leads
to increased global welfare via restoring an e±cient allocation of industry.
18Trade costs will, at a certain point, counteract the `lower-wage' e®ect on prices. However, high
trade costs undermine stability of the core-periphery equilibrium in the ¯rst place, which is why we
concentrated on lower levels of ¿ from the outset.
164 Winners and losers of the subsidy race
The above analysis showed that unionized core bene¯ts from inducing a relocation of
¯rms towards the periphery country f. It chooses a subsidy level at which the periphery
can pro¯tably attract all industry. Hence, both countries are clearly winners of the
game and bene¯t from delocating industry towards a country with a non-distorted
labor market. This section identi¯es the winners and the losers of the subsidy race
within the di®erent income groups. We begin with country h's and f's capital owners.
Proposition 4 Capitalists in both locations are the clear winners of the subsidy race.
Capitalists in h win due to the repatriation of capital income whereas capitalists in f
bene¯t from a lower cost-of-living index.
Proof: See Appendix C. ¥
For core's capital owners, the bene¯ts from repatriating subsidies exceed the cost of
incurring transport costs for imported varieties. Capitalists in f bene¯t from a lower
cost-of-living index while the ¯nancing cost for subsidies are shared between capitalists
and workers.
The impact on workers in the new core country is however ambiguous. To begin with

















The di®erence in price indices is negative since P c
f < P
p
f, indicating that workers are
better o® with ¯rms producing in their country. The last term, however, indicates
that workers might be better o® in a periphery when ¯nancing costs are high. Fig. 3
illustrates the welfare di®erential in (28).
Fig. 3 reveals that workers in f will only bene¯t from an industry relocation for low
¾. Put di®erently, workers in f win only if they have severely su®ered from wage cost
exporting, i.e. for high union wages (low ¾) such that it becomes worthwhile to incur
the ¯nancing costs of attracting ¯rms.
Intuitively, union members as a whole lose as industry shifts towards f. Their real
income unambiguously falls on two counts, the decline of the nominal wage and the
increase of the price index. The di®erence of before and after welfare of union workers
17Figure 3: Foreign workers' welfare di®erential









Á = 0:6; ® = 0:3; µ = 1:
denoted as V c
u and V p



















Fig. 4 depicts union workers' welfare di®erential in (29) for di®erent ¾ which con¯rms
that union workers particularly su®er from subsidy competition for low ¾, i.e. high
union wages.
Figure 4: Welfare of h's union workers before and after industry relocation











Á = 0:6 and ® = 0:3:
18Turning to non-union workers in h, their welfare di®erential is obtained after inserting












From inspection of (30) it is not ex ante clear whether non-union workers unambigu-
ously bene¯t from industry relocation towards a country with no labor market distor-
tion. More precisely, non-union workers bene¯t from industry delocation as they no
longer bear high consumer prices resulting from asymmetric unionization (this e®ect
is captured in `lnwh') whereas they su®er from losing all industry as they have to bear
transport costs for imported varieties which is re°ected through `lnÁ'. To learn whether
the overall e®ect is positive or negative Fig. 5 displays non-union workers' before and
after welfare di®erential at di®erent levels of ¾ evaluated at di®erent degrees of trade
freeness.
Figure 5: Welfare of h's non-union workers (before and after industry relocation)















Surprisingly, non-union workers were better o® for low ¾, i.e. under (high) union wages
and experience higher welfare from industry relocation only for higher ¾ (low union
wages). This seems to be counterintuitive at ¯rst sight as we would expect non-union
workers to gain (like workers in f) especially for low ¾, i.e. for high union wages. To
understand the result, ¯rst note that non-union workers face a trade o® between higher
consumer prices due to union wages and higher consumer prices because of shipping
19costs. However, recall that a low elasticity of substitution ¾ implies high union wages
but at the same time indicates a high love for variety. Consequently, consumers in h
su®er from industry delocation especially if their valuation for the industrial good is
high as this leads to a strong increase in the cost-of-living index Ph which depresses
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1¡¾(¾2 ¡ 1 ¡ ¾ lnÁ)
(1 + µ)(¾ ¡ 1)4 > 0: (31)
which re°ects that an increasing elasticity of substitution (a declining `love for variety'
and lower union wages) attenuates the loss arising from a high peripheral cost-of-living
index. This e®ect is ampli¯ed by decreasing levels of trade freeness.
5 Discussion
Obviously, our strong main result arises out of two speci¯c assumptions: Firstly, gov-
ernments are true welfare-maximizers and weigh workers' and capital owners' utility
equally. Then, the most e±cient solution prevails, which is o®shoring production to a
location where the labor market is not distorted.19 A straightforward extension here is
to assume a government that only cares about workers, which could be due to its pref-
erences or the fact that capital ownership is concentrated in very few hands, whereas
the by far biggest share of households are labor households. In this case, the core will
not ¯nd it optimal to get rid of its industry up to a certain union wage, but will rather
accept the distortion which is partially borne by periphery's residents. We brie°y il-
lustrate the case of a government that does not care about capital owners: Such a
government's objective function has as its arguments only A- and M-sector workers'
utility. Apart from that, we proceed in perfect analogy to the analysis above, i.e., we
compare price indices and welfare levels with all industrial activity in h and f, re-
spectively, and work out the critical tax/subsidy levels ^ zmax
h , ^ zd
h under this alternative
scenario. Finally, inserting the optimal policies under the revised scenario into the gov-
ernment objective function and conducting government h's welfare comparison, like
19The tax game here has, as is true of many of the models in this literature, an auction-like character
- hence the globally e±cient outcome.



















Inserting the new subsidy levels ^ zd






















As one would expect, it is rising in the agglomeration force (µ) and in trade freeness
(Á). Since technological spillovers as well as the level of trade integration increase the
agglomeration rent, it also decreases the cost of ¯nancing a subsidy level necessary to
defend the core. These familiar e®ects notwithstanding, core's optimal decision in this
alternative `leftist' scenario is no longer as clear cut as it was in Section 3. To see this
Fig. 6 illustrates the welfare di®erence as a function of the union wage rate wh.
Figure 6: h's welfare di®erence between being core and periphery for di®erent union wages












¾ = 4; ® = 0:5; µ = 0:3; Á = 0:6:
For moderate union wages a `leftist' government that represents workers' interests will
set a subsidy level low enough to prevent a relocation of industry towards an e±cient
outcome. This may not seem too surprising as unionized workers bene¯t from the
distortion, but remember that non-union workers and home capitalists equally enter
the government's welfare calculus.
Even though the model is highly stylized, we think the model and its predictions have
intuitive appeal: Due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function, the M-sector can
21be thought of as one speci¯c industry producing di®erentiated goods, whereas the
competitive sector represents the (`big') rest of the economy. If such a sector su®ers
from a labor market distortion, it may not be ex ante clear that a government will ¯nd it
in its best interest to compensate mobile factors for high wages. Rather, it may well be
welfare-enhancing to use tax instruments or other government action to get industries
o®shored to low-wage countries, which bene¯ts consumers with low consumer prices and
shareholders with higher dividends. Thinking of particular industries such as consumer
electronics, it may well be that industrialized countries' governments have understood
that it can be in their best interest to allow production and assembling to be shifted
to places with lower labor costs. Then, downward pressure on taxes bene¯ts them as
national shareholders gain from them. Thinking of the car industry, on the contrary,
one typically has in mind that jurisdictions do a lot to hold on to it, which may show the
importance of local interest groups as decisions on industry- or even ¯rm-speci¯c tax
breaks or subsidies will not only, in general, be based on national welfare-maximizing
behavior, but also on the interests of local politicians.
6 Conclusion
In a simple model of tax competition between countries with asymmetric union power
and agglomeration tendencies, we have shown that the government of the agglomerated
and unionized country may not have an incentive to try to hold on to its industry.
Instead of realizing the bene¯ts from higher wage income while exporting part of the
wage burden to foreign consumers via higher prices, it rather allows the competing
country to attract industry and bene¯t from the other country's generous tax regime as
well as low production costs, leading to low consumer prices. Tax competition is welfare
enhancing as it leads to a relocation of industry towards a country with a non-distorted
labor market. In contrast to the previous literature which focused on the agglomeration-
holding country's ability to hold on to the core, we show why its willingness to do so
may be curtailed. The ¯nding has intuitive appeal when one thinks of the fact that
welfare is, after all, driven by consumption, which in this case is increased by two facts:
Lower prices because of the circumvented labor market distortion, and higher income
because of capitalists' repatriated income. We highlight the way in which winners and
22losers are generated in tax competition and leave it for future work to look into this in
more depth empirically. In terms of theory, it seems promising to examine the role of
special interest groups and their organization when it comes to in°uencing governments
in their choice of policy variables in the presence of international tax competition.
Appendix
A Proof of proposition 2
Global welfare is derived adding up the indirect utility functions of A sector workers,
unionized and non-unionized M workers as well as capital owners across countries.
Taking the di®erence of global welfare evaluated at sn = 1 and global welfare at sn = 0

















one can easily see that the expression above is non-negative for ¾ > 1. ¥
B Proof of proposition 3
Setting zh = zd
h and zf = zmin
f (zh) in equation (27), as well as inserting the respective








(wh ¡ 1) ¡ 2®lnwh: (A.2)
Note that the ¯rst term is simply union's objective which is the excess wage bill of its
members whereas the second term denotes the potential bene¯t of a relocation, namely














This term is smaller than zero for any ® > 0;¾ > 1, indicating that the government
in h will always be better o® when the core is in f. The equilibrium subsidy levels are
given by z¤
h = zd
h ¡ ² and z¤
f = zmin
f (z¤
h), for some small ². ¥
23C Proof of proposition 4
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This expression will be in¯nitely negative for ¾ ! 1 and approaches zero for ¾ ! 1.
Hence, capitalists in h gain from ¯rms' relocation towards the union-unionized country.





























which is unambiguously positive for any ® > 0, ¾ > 1 and 0 < Á < 1. ¥
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